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Discretion in Legal Decision Making (‘beleid’)

Definition
Beleid is a Dutch concept which is difficult to translate as it is an integral part of Dutch culture and society. The English equivalent ‘policy’ covers only half of its meaning. The definition of beleid in an authoritative dictionary of the Dutch language refers to a set of contradictory connotations: on the one hand, beleid means to manage and administer (besturen) on the basis of principles and policies. This would allude to top-down planning if a second meaning were not implied simultaneously, i.e. considerate treatment (bedachtzaamheid), preferably by hearing all those concerned and giving them a say. Strictly speaking, these connotations contain opposites: one can either take decisions against the wishes of at least some of those concerned, or one can come to an agreement with mutual consent, which implies non-decisions in the case of a veto or resistance. In theory and practise beleid is a mixture of both. 
Beleid is the art of rule making and rule implementation in context. In the legalistic model law is always formulated top-down: public agencies are bound by the law and should not do anything not within the law. The concept of beleid is the expression of a bottom-up strategy, either by the managers of implementation agencies who formulate guidelines or by street-level officers who have to render rules and guidelines ‘workable’ in their daily practice. As complex organizations government agencies tend to specify their mission in terms of beleid, sometimes vaguely as declarations of intent, sometimes explicitly as guidelines. 
Of course, civil servants and the police everywhere resort to such informal strategies. Typical for the Dutch situation may simply be the publicity and legitimacy with which they do so. Instead of being forced to maintain a façade of strict legalism, lower level agents enjoy discretionary power and formulate their beleid. It may achieve quasi-legal status as a yardstick for the performance of a public agency.

Informal Pragmatism and the Sliding Scale
For a good understanding of beleid one cannot refrain from an assessment of the internal legal culture in the Netherlands. While external legal culture refers to the legal consciousness of the people at large, internal legal culture refers to the opinions about law among the legal professionals, ‘the values, ideologies and principles of lawyers, judges and others who work within the magic circle of the legal system’ (Friedman, 1975: 194). Because of its non-legalistic leanings Dutch internal legal culture can be characterized as informal pragmatism. A basic tenet is that rules should only be applied if some goal is served by it, thus not for their own sake. Dutch policy makers, civil servants and legal practitioners are very concerned about the adverse effects of too strict a rule enforcement (e.g. black markets, and deviant subcultures). Rules cannot cover everything, and compliance needs agreement, is the dominant feeling. It is a firmly rooted belief that if times are changing, laws have to change with them. Social developments are seen as having their own dynamics, irrespective of personal and political preferences. In the long run power politics and top-down management are regarded as counter-productive. Among the public at large a general distrust of politicians and parliamentary politics goes together with a great belief in experts, dealing with facts rather than principles.

Informal pragmatism uses the tool of a sliding scale: at the one extreme a blind eye is turned to vices with minor ramifications, e.g. drug abuse in private, at the other extreme strict law enforcement is called for when the stakes are high, e.g. production and trade in hard drugs. In the absence of a yardstick the intermediate cases are of course the hard ones: what is the Dutch approach to hard-drug addicts, and to the suppliers of soft drugs? In theory pragmatism tackles these questions, raised by the facts, one by one and by trial and error, trying to strike a balance between a counter-productive zero tolerance and an unproductive wait-and-see attitude. In practice the facts are quite often decisive, however, resulting in an unfounded and half-hearted ‘yes’, one has to admit. But in informal pragmatism inconsistent outcomes are preferred to blind rule enforcement. 

Beleid, inspired by informal pragmatism and its mechanism of the sliding scale, is conditioned culturally as well as structurally. According to Hofstede & Hofstede the Netherlands share with the Scandinavian countries an extremely feminine culture, stressing values such as equality, solidarity, sympathy for the weak, and resolution of conflicts by negotiation and compromise. Another research revealed that Dutch middle-managers empathized with their opponents in conflicts more than their colleagues from other feminine countries (Van Oudenhoven a.o). A need to negotiate and to compromise is structurally embedded in Dutch politics as there is never one party with an absolute majority. As a consequence, Dutch politicians, in particular the Christian democrats, who have been in power since 1917 with an interval from 1994 until 2002, but always in coalition, are used to wheeling and dealing. On the one hand, moral crusades thus never found an unmitigated outlet in moral legislation, and, on the other hand, the Christian democrats could always veto attempts to legalize practices that were considered immoral. Only when the Christian democrats were out of office the government of socialists and liberals could lift the ban on keeping a brothel (2000), decriminalize euthanasia (2001), and introduce same sex marriages (2001). The same holds true in the socio-economic area with liberals favoring market incentives, socialists favoring redistribution and welfare provisions, and Christian democrats in between. It is noteworthy that the Dutch welfare state is less a product of welfare paternalism from the part of a dominant socialist party, as seems to be the case in the Scandinavian countries, than the outcome of beleid. 

Three policy areas may illustrate the concept of beleid. Beleid is at its best in the Dutch approach to crimes without victims, and in social and economic affairs with the so-called ‘poldermodel’, which can be loosely translated as the model of never ending consultation rounds with interest groups. The third example, i.e. the policy of toleration (gedoog-beleid) in administrative practice, highlights the drawbacks of beleid: it disguises a battle between private and public interests, which is regularly lost by the latter. Beleid is sometimes a cover-up for indolence and indulgence. 

Drugs policy and a euthanasia act 
Although the drug laws clearly forbid using and dealing in drugs, prosecution guidelines elaborate on the distinction in the Opium Act between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ drugs. Since Dutch criminal law allows, but does not compel, the prosecution services to bring a crime to court, non-prosecution can be a matter of beleid. In this vein the prosecution guidelines that set explicit standards for non‑prosecution date back to 1976: possession of soft drugs was considered negligible up to 30 grams, and small amounts of hard drugs would be ignored except where there are prior convictions. New guidelines for (non-)prosecution were published in 1996. The basic distinction between soft and hard drugs is still there. The conditions for a tolerated coffeeshop, which serves less coffee than soft drugs, have been specified: no selling of hard drugs and alcoholic drinks, no selling to minors, a maximum of 5 grams for each transaction, no advertising and no nuisance to the neighbors. (The significant reduction in the allowable amount of soft drugs for personal use - from 30 to 5 grams - largely plays lip service to other European countries.) This is only half of the story, however. The other half is that the police anticipate the prosecutors' beleid and take it as a starting point for setting their own priorities at grassroots level. As a result, it is difficult to say when and where, and as a consequence also why and why not, the law will be enforced. 

The Dutch Parliament accepted an act on euthanasia in 2001, which a year later entered into force. A new second section to the provision in the Code of criminal law, which threatens someone who takes the life of another at the explicit and earnest request of the latter with a maximum sentence of 12 years imprisonment, exempts a doctor who has met criteria which have been developed in the case law; the most important condition for non-prosecution is a procedurally controlled ascertainment of the patient's death-wish, checked by a second practitioner. Whereas the non-prosecution beleid concerning soft drugs stands in isolation, the non-prosecution beleid concerning euthanasia was a process of fine-tuning consisting of leading cases of the Supreme Court, failed attempts at legalization and prosecution guidelines in close concert with the professional association of doctors. Beleid started to play a key role in the early 1990s when the conditions for non-prosecution were laid down. Beleid allows for a gray zone between what is lawful and what is unlawful, and in the absence of hard and fast legislative rules the soft law of beleid was informative as to the prosecution policy. At the end of 1998 five regional advisory bodies, consisting of three experts (in law, medicine and ethics) were established bridging the medical and the legal world. Since then the doctor who helped a patient to die has to notify the advisory body instead of the prosecutor. The idea of the advisory bodies is to persuade doctors to report more honestly, as many cases of euthanasia were and still are reported as natural deaths, an easy way out if the doctor wants no trouble, neither for him/herself nor for the deceased’s next of kin. Although, strictly speaking, they have become superfluous after legalization the advisory bodies are still thought to be useful. Their very existence does not detract from the formal powers of the prosecution, but in practice doctors may legitimately expect that their report is the end of the legal story. 

‘Poldermodel’ in socio-economic affairs
The reconstruction after World War II laid the foundations for what has recently been coined the poldermodel with reference to the Dutch struggle against the water and the miraculous transformation of water into land. It stands for decision-making on the basis of mutual trust and consensus building. In the strong version it denotes corporatist self-government: the programs of the welfare state such as health and social insurance, unemployment and workers' compensation schemes were administered by tripartite bodies. Organizations of employers and employees agreed with the government on the definition of the public interest, and showed self-restraint in their demands. In the 1970s the welfare state went out of control: the deficits in the public budget increased and loopholes undermined the do-good policies. Facing direct government intervention the employers and the unions agreed that something must be done. Measures against the self-service arrangements of the welfare state have been taken, and by cuts in spending the public budget has decreased from 67% of the gross domestic product in 1983 to 48% in 1999, a good start for the introduction of the euro in 2001. 

The recovery from the budgetary crisis has partly to do with the Dutch cultural mix of consensus, egalitarianism, and trust in the sense Fukuyama uses the term. (Another explanation for the extraordinary economic revival is the supply of a female labor force and the economic expansion in labor-intensive commercial consultancy.) In high-trust societies, such as the Netherlands, trust finds expression in consensus building or beleid. It is a weaker version of the ‘poldermodel’ than corporatist self-regulation though. In the absence of a shared definition of the public interest, deadlock situations occur more frequently, problems in need of a solution are tucked away, only to pop up a few years later in a worse condition, and the top cannot be sure about the implementation of their decisions at grassroots level. Against this background one can understand prime ministers criticizing the captains of industry for their ‘exhibitionist self-enrichment’. The poldermodel is at risk if certain participants do not show the self-restraint required by the system, and the term suggests too much effective planning for what in fact is simply muddling through. 

‘Gedoogbeleid’ and elusive responsibilities 
The contrast between command and control rules as against bottom-up and soft beleid is at its strongest in the practice of the administrative policy of tolerance (gedoogbeleid). Gedoog-beleid is second degree beleid in cases where first degree beleid does not work. Too much gedoogbeleid results in a shadow administration which functions as a legal order of its own. It consists of administrative decisions in black and white allowing individuals and corporations to transgress the law, judges who uphold these decisions, and academics who study and comment on the gray legal order as if it were the official legal order. Principles of equality and non-discrimination, predictability and the protection of third party interests play their - subdued - role. One and the same event (contrary to the rules a local official agreed to the deposit of polluted mud) led to two leading cases of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that (i) civil servants are not liable to punishment if the wrongdoing fits within the pattern of the municipality’s ‘gedogen’, and (ii) municipalities are not liable to punishment if the wrongdoing has taken place in the context of a public task (the local council is supposed to exercise control). The dire consequences of this case law for third parties were brought to light by two disasters. A firework factory exploded in the middle of the city of Enschede in 2000. In total, 23 people died in the ensuing inferno, and part of the town was reduced to a ruin. And 14 youngsters lost their lives and more than 200 were seriously burnt in a fire in an overcrowded bar in Volendam on New Year’s Eve 2001. It turned out that the entrepreneurs in both cases did not possess the required permissions because they had some leverage on the local municipality (beleid by default, one might call this). The prosecution refused to instigate proceedings because of the case law, in the absence of which other authorities were asked to investigate the disasters in a non-committal and therapeutic way. 
It may be difficult to translate the concept of beleid, but it is even harder to translate its extended and, at the same time, contradictory version gedoogbeleid, and it is almost impossible to understand the latter’s rationale, because the sliding scale deteriorates into a slippery slope. 
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